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● Hirt, Kardes, & Markman (2004) found that by asking participants
to generate alternative reasons (i.e reasons for why a Portland
basketball team would win against __ ) it reduced biases in the
participant’s judgement as it led them to recognize that the focal
outcome was not inevitable. Participants avoided, therefore,
overestimating the likelihood an outcome would occur.
● This study also found that the beneﬁts of counterfactual thinking
were transferable, meaning once one was promoted to think
counterfactually in one domain, they had reduced judgments in an
unrelated domain.
● Similar to previous research, Hirt et al. (2004) noted that
judgmental biases were only reduced when alternatives were easy
to generate, as a difﬁculty to think of alternatives leads to belief
that the focal outcome was inevitable (i.e reasons for why a
notoriously bad basketball team would win against an elite
basketball team is hard to think of, therefore it reinforces the idea
that the elite basketball team will win) (Schwarz & Vaugn, 2002;
Sanna et al., 2002).
● This study is designed to determine whether the beneﬁts of
counterfactual thinking are applicable to understanding
psychological research. It will also test whether the ease of
generating alternative reasons will affect if judgement biases are
reduced and if the effort is transferable.

● Participants will be recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk
and the General Psychology Pool. Materials will be used in the
format of an online survey via Qualtrics.
● Procedure
To do so, this study will be giving participants the same tasks
seen in Hirt et al. (2004), except using psychological studies.
• Baseline: Participants are asked to explain the outcome of
one psychological study (Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014)
• In addition to this, other groups do the following:
● Consider The Opposite: Participants are asked to explain
the alternative outcome for Mueller & Oppenheimer
(2014).
● Plausible—Transfer: Participants explain the alternative
outcome for a study where consideration of the
alternative is easy (Bauer et al, 2007)
● Implausible—Transfer: Participants explain the
alternative outcome for a study where consideration of
the alternative is difﬁcult (Moffat & Kelly, 2006)
■ Test (all groups): Participants are asked to estimate the
results of Mueller & Oppenheimer (2014).

Baseline

Consider the
Opposite

Plausible-Transfer

Implausible-Transfer

Why might taking notes by hand be better for test performance than taking notes by a computer?
(Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014).

Why might taking
notes on a computer
be better?

(Mueller & Oppenheimer,
2014)

Why might keeping
rather than changing
your answers on a test
be better?
(Bauer et al, 2007)

Why might
non-musicians be
better than musicians
at recognizing when
music samples are
conducted by a
computer?
(Moffat & Kelly, 2006)

Test: When people took notes on a laptop, their average grade was 45.74%. With this in mind,
please estimate: When people took notes by hand, I estimate that their average grade was
____%. (Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014).

In line with Hirt et al.’s ﬁndings, we predict:
● Baseline: Participants will estimate high test scores
for those who took notes by hand.
● Consider the Opposite: Participants will estimate
low test scores for those who took notes by hand.
● Plausible-Transfer: Participants will estimate high
test scores for those who took notes by hand (if
transfer).
● Implausible-Transfer: Participants will estimate low
test scores for those who took notes by hand (if
transfer).
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